Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. " Are Corporate Restructuring Events Driven by Common Factors? Implications for Takeover Prediction," " Takeover Likelihood Models for UK Quoted Companies,"ġ999-W06, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. " A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do we stand?," Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, Luc, 2008.& Renneboog, L.D.R., 2006.Ģ006-003, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.į33698ff-8dc9-4024-8a44-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.Ģ006-6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. 31(2), pages 135-175, April.įull references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS) Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. " Does corporate performance improve after mergers?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. " Predicting takeover targets : A methodological and empirical analysis," " Evaluating the performance of value versus glamour stocks The impact of selection bias," & Jegadeesh, Narasimhan & Lakonishok, Josef, 1995.
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. " Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 101-136, " Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers," " Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," " Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Vishny, 1988.Ģ532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State. " Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control,"ĥ2, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988.Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, and that negotiations are publicized earlier in hostile transactions. Alternatively, hostility could reflect just a perceptual distinction arising from different patterns of public disclosure, where negotiated outcomes are the rule and transactions tend to be characterized as friendly when bargaining remains undisclosed throughout, and hostile when the public becomes aware of the negotiation before its resolution. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers are typically attributed to the value of replacing incumbent managers and the gains from friendly takeovers are typically attributed to strategic synergies. This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data.
0 kommentar(er)
